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the role of the notion “security”  
in the history of liBeral thought
The article is devoted to the topical issue of the correlation between security and freedom which became 
even more acute after acts of terrorism in Paris in 2015. Such a correlation is studied in the theories of 
Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and John Stuart Mill that are of a high importance for liberal thought. It is 
argued that although these thinkers devoted considerable attention to formulate a principle of liberty, a 
principle of security was of a higher importance to them. 
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The scandal around US and UK surveillance 
programs Prism and Tempora that was initiated by the 
former NSA contractor Edward Snowden, as well as 
terrorist attacks in Paris in January and November 2015 
have shown how acute and topical the problem of a 
correlation between security and freedom is.
Of course, the issue of a conflict between security 
and freedom must be addressed within a much broader 
study; however, a small part of it is researched in this 
article. It is devoted to the theme of a correlation 
between security and freedom in the history of liberal 
ideas. The theories of three influential thinkers, Thomas 
Hobbes, John Locke, and John Stuart Mill will be taken 
into consideration. It is argued that although they played 
a crucial role in the development of liberal thought, the 
notion “security” was always of a higher importance 
than “freedom” and “liberty” for these classical thinkers.
It is debatable, whether Hobbes was liberal or not. 
Pierre Manent, for example, calls Hobbes a founder of 
liberalism [4, р. 65]. Judith N. Shklar, on the other hand, 
claims that Hobbes was completely illiberal [8, р. 24]. 
According to her, Locke and Mill are two founders of 
liberal theory [8, р. 26–27]. Pierre Rosanvallon derives 
the establishment of liberalism from the 17th century, 
when it continued the processes of political secularization 
and recognition of individual priority that started in the 
14th century [7, р. 12]. He adds that in this sense it is 
more a cultural paradigm than a specialized doctrine. 
Crawford Brough Macpherson argues that although 
individualism – a distinctive characteristic of the 17th 
century liberalism – is present in Hobbes’ doctrine, “his 
conclusion can scarcely be called liberal” [3, р. 1]; 
Locke is according to Macpherson “the fountain-head 
of English liberalism” [3, р. 262]. Therefore, it is better 
to say that liberal theory has its beginning in the 
17th century. Hobbes was not a liberal, simply because 
liberalism as an ideology came into existence after him, 
post the French revolution. Many Hobbes’ ideas cannot 
be called liberal in any way. He did formulate a 
theoretical basis for liberalism, however, which may be 
called a headspring of liberal theory with Locke as its 
founder. Consequently, it is important to investigate the 
ideas that created a foundation for liberal theory.
For Hobbes liberty was one of the basic natural 
characteristics of a human being – “the Right of Nature, 
that is, the naturall Liberty of man” [1, ch. XXVI]. 
“The RIGHT OF NATURE, which Writers 
commonly call Jus Naturale, is the Liberty each man 
hath, to use his own power, as he will himselfe, for the 
preservation of his own Nature; that is to say, of his own 
Life…” [1, ch. XIV].
Liberty thus is the first and the most important mean 
of self-preservation. At the same time, absolute liberty 
is a great danger to safety of every person. 
“For as amongst masterlesse men, there is 
perpetuall war, of every man against his neighbour; no 
inheritance, to transmit to the Son, nor to expect from 
the Father; no propriety of Goods, or Lands; no 
security; but a full and absolute Libertie in every 
Particular man…” [1, ch. XXI].
That is why Hobbes distinguishes absolute liberty, 
which is liberty without a commonwealth, liberty in the 
natural condition of war of every one against every one, 
and liberty in a commonwealth – “true Liberty of a 
Subject”, which is a great value for Hobbes. In order to 
preserve liberty, Hobbes insists that a person should “be 
contented with so much liberty against other men, as he 
would allow other men against himselfe” [1, ch. XIV]. 
“For in whatsoever is not regulated by the Common-
wealth, tis Equity (which is the Law of Nature, and 
therefore an eternall Law of God) that every man 
equally enjoy his liberty” [1, ch. XXVI].
At this point it is important to involve Locke into 
consideration. He also differentiates two types of liberty: 
in a state of nature and in a commonwealth. 
“THE natural liberty of man is to be free from any 
superior power on earth, and not to be under the will or 
legislative authority of man, but to have only the law 
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of nature for his rule. The liberty of man, in society, is 
to be under no other legislative power, but that 
established, by consent, in the commonwealth; nor 
under the dominion of any will, or restraint of any law, 
but what that legislative shall enact, according to the 
trust put in it” [2, р. IV–22].
For Locke the second type of liberty is the only true 
liberty: “…the end of law is not to abolish or restrain, 
but to preserve and enlarge freedom: for in all the states 
of created beings capable of laws, where there is no law, 
there is no freedom: for liberty is, to be free from 
restraint and violence from others; which cannot be, 
where there is no law…” [2, р. VI–57].
Therefore, for now it is possible to make a 
provisional conclusion that according to liberal theory 
absolute liberty constitutes a great danger, and true 
liberty is possible only in combination with security.
To continue this line of development, it should be 
stated that the main point in theories by Hobbes and 
Locke is very similar: to ensure security for people. 
The main sources of danger for a person are, however, 
different: the evil nature of other persons for Hobbes: 
“And Law was brought into the world for nothing else, 
but to limit the naturall liberty of particular men, in 
such manner, as they might not hurt, but assist one 
another…” [1, ch. XXVI], and the evil nature of 
persons who occupy authority positions for Locke: 
“…men found it necessary to examine more carefully 
the original and rights of government; and to find out 
ways to restrain the exorbitances, and prevent the 
abuses of that power, which they having intrusted in 
another’s hands only for their own good, they found 
was made use of to hurt them” [2, р. VIII–111].
In the first case, it is more urgent to prevent harm 
done to a subject of a commonwealth by other subjects, 
in the second case – to defend against state.
Despite this difference, both theories share one 
main idea: the end or the main goal of a commonwealth 
or a political body is to provide security and protection 
for a person from the evil nature of others. However, 
the central causes of this are different, since Locke 
sees the main danger in people who occupy authority 
positions, thus, in state, which, created to ensure 
security, endangers it. Locke writes: “…the 
enjoyment of the property he has in this state [of 
nature] is very unsafe, very unsecure. This makes 
him willing to quit a condition, which, however free, 
is full of fears and continual dangers: and it is not 
without reason, that he seeks out, and is willing to 
join in society with others… for the mutual 
preservation of their lives, liberties and estates, which 
I call by the general name, property” [2, р. IX–123].
The founder of liberalism thus tells: when people 
are completely free, they do not want to stay in that 
condition, they want security to preserve their lives, 
liberties, and estates (the difference from Hobbes is the 
addition of the two latter categories).
It was one of the main attempts of Leviathan to 
reconcile liberty with another central notion of this 
treatise, security, in order to secure both of them: 
“…as long as this naturall Right of every man to 
every thing endureth, there can be no security to any 
man…” [1, ch. XIV]. “The finall Cause, End, or 
Designe of men, (who naturally love Liberty, and 
Dominion over others,) … is the foresight of their 
own preservation, and of a more contented life 
thereby…” [1, ch. XVII]. According to Hobbes, the 
end of the commonwealth is “…to produce the peace 
and security of the people…” [1, ch. XIX] or “…the 
procuration of the safety of the people…” 
[1, ch. XXX]. Locke claims just the same: “The great 
and chief end, therefore, of men’s uniting into 
commonwealths, and putting themselves under 
government, is the preservation of their property” 
[2, р. IX–124]. “[T]he first and fundamental natural 
law, which is to govern even the legislative itself, is 
the preservation of the society, and (as far as will 
consist with the public good) of every person in it” 
[2, р. XI–134].
It was Locke who developed this idea into an 
intention to restrain state and power. “It is not, nor can 
possibly be absolutely arbitrary over the lives and 
fortunes of the people: for it being but the joint power of 
every member of the society given up to that person, or 
assembly, which is legislator… It is a power, that hath 
no other end but preservation, and therefore can never 
have a right to destroy, enslave, or designedly to 
impoverish the subjects” [2, р. XI–135].
This line leads then to the main intention of 
liberalism – to restrain and limit state and power. From 
the first glance, it is the liberal notion of liberty which 
provides the ground for this negative attitude toward 
power and state as a whole. According to Mill, “The 
power itself is illegitimate. The best government has 
no more title to it than the worst” [5, р. 30]. Nonetheless, 
the investigation of the history of liberal ideas shows 
that the real source of this intention is security. The 
theme of Mill’s treatise On Liberty is “Civil, or Social 
Liberty: the nature and limits of the power which can 
be legitimately exercised by society over the 
individual” [5, р. 1]. How does Mill understand 
liberty? “The only freedom which deserves the name, 
is that of pursuing our own good in our own way, so 
long as we do not attempt to deprive others of theirs, or 
impede their efforts to obtain it” [5, р. 23]. There is, 
however, one significant exception to this crucial 
liberty to choose one’s own modus vivendi: “The 
principle of freedom cannot require that he should be 
free not to be free. It is not freedom, to be allowed to 
alienate his freedom” [5, p. 195].
10 НАУКОВІ ЗАПИСКИ. Том 173. Політичні науки
One of consequences of such an anti-power and 
anti-state intention is expressed in this extract: “Unless 
opinions favourable to democracy and to aristocracy, to 
property and to equality, to co-operation and to 
competition, to luxury and to abstinence, to sociality 
and individuality, to liberty and discipline, and all the 
other standing antagonisms of practical life, are 
expressed with equal freedom, and enforced and 
defended with equal talent and energy, there is no 
chance of both elements obtaining their due; one scale is 
sure to go up and the other down” [5, р. 88].
This means that liberalism does not share any of 
these ideas and proclaims only the necessity of 
securing the possibility for these ideas to contest. The 
liberal principle is to defend all the ideas from 
banishment by an authority, but not to choose any. 
Such an attitude, being apolitical and neutral, is odd 
for an ideology. Consequently, liberal politicians 
have on hand only the void principle of no compelling 
of any concrete idea; hence they do not have practical 
principles to grasp, to lean on, and to follow in 
political actions. It is important not to confuse such 
neutrality with pluralism which is a political principle 
of a competition between different political ideas; it 
does not share the apolitical intention and abstinence 
from choice of a certain political point of view.
Chantal Mouffe also accentuates this problem: 
she is against “extreme pluralism that emphasizes 
heterogeneity and incommensurability and 
according to which pluralism – understood as 
valorization of all differences – should have no 
limits” [6, р. 20]. Pluralism is a wholesome 
political principle only when it is combined with 
choice and antagonism; pluralism without 
antagonism misses the aspect of the political and is 
named by Mouffe “the typical liberal illusion” [6, 
р. 20]. Using Carl Schmitt’s terminology, deprived 
of its political meaning and the necessity of a 
choice or a decision, pluralism transforms into 
neutrality and leads to securitization.
According to Mill, there is a great danger to the 
true liberty of a person not only from the government, 
but also from society itself: “…it practises a social 
tyranny more formidable than many kinds of political 
oppression, since, though not usually upheld by such 
extreme penalties, it leaves fewer means of escape, 
penetrating much more deeply into the details of life, 
and enslaving the soul itself. Protection, therefore, 
against the tyranny of the magistrate is not enough: 
there needs protection also against the tyranny of the 
prevailing opinion and feeling…” [5, р. 8].
Consequently, the main goal of On Liberty was to 
find out “where to place the limit – how to make the 
fitting adjustment between individual independence 
and social control” [5, р. 9].
Here we can observe an important twist in Mill’s 
logic: “The object of this Essay is to assert one very 
simple principle, as entitled to govern absolutely the 
dealings of society with the individual in the way of 
compulsion and control, whether the means used be 
physical force in the form of legal penalties, or the moral 
coercion of public opinion. That principle is, that the 
sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually 
or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of 
any of their number, is self-protection” [5, р. 17].
He states further: “That the only purpose for which 
power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a 
civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm 
to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not 
a sufficient warrant” [5, р. 17]. Mill’s main idea is that 
there should be no interference in private life with one 
exception – in those cases that concern security. And 
here is a totally different situation: everyone is 
responsible, compulsion is justifiable, and almost every 
mean to ensure security is permitted.
It is interesting to find such an extract in the 
treatise by one of the founders of liberalism: “The 
liberty of the individual must be thus far limited; he 
must not make himself a nuisance to other people. 
But if he refrains from molesting others in what 
concerns them, and merely acts according to his own 
inclination and judgment in things which concern 
himself, the same reasons which show that opinion 
should be free, prove also that he should be allowed, 
without molestation, to carry his opinions into 
practice at his own cost” [5, р. 104].
Hence, the logic is very clear: the main way to 
ensure the freedom to choose one’s own modus 
vivendi is to guarantee security. While reading On 
Liberty, one can see the development of the line 
started by Hobbes: the principle of security is always 
present. For Mill, the main notion of liberalism is not 
only liberty, but also security.
The fundamentals of political liberalism have thus 
been discussed. In the second half of the 18th century, 
economic liberalism came to existence as a solution to 
those problems that were not solved by political 
philosophy of social contract [7, р. 49–50]. Later, in the 
middle of the 19th century, Adam Smith was 
acknowledged as a founder of economic liberalism [7, 
р. 140]. Such standardization contained a hidden agenda 
of development of economic liberalism into the 
dominating ideology of bourgeoisie. In such a case 
economic liberalism should have been detached from 
any connection with political liberalism [7, р. 140].
However, these two currents are connected not 
only historically, but also conceptually. They 
correspond with the type of society where social 
relations are based on utility and equity, but not on the 
idea of a given community; they share the idea of 
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depersonalization of forces that rule society and the 
principle of individual autonomy [7, р. 13]. 
Consequently, it is possible to speak about three 
utopias of liberalism: a utopia of market society; a 
utopia that legal order can substitute political order; a 
utopia that the social world consists of autonomous 
individuals who are the only masters of their lives [7, 
р. 14]. Although political liberalism carried some anti-
state ideas, it was economic liberalism that brought the 
strong anti-political intention to liberal theory.
As it was shown, the principle of security is of a 
higher importance within the theories of Hobbes, Locke, 
and Mill than the principle of freedom or liberty. This 
line of priority extends to the contemporary Western 
society and is quite widespread within it. The political 
practice of reaction with security measures to security 
threats should not neglect the necessity of protecting 
personal freedom and privacy. 
It is clear that some amount of security is a necessary 
prerequisite for liberty; however, too much security 
endangers freedom. Therefore, it is one of the most 
important tasks for contemporary society, to find a 
proper balance between two principles, especially as 
technical means provide extensive and powerful tools 
of surveillance. Besides, intelligence and law 
enforcement officers, as well as some politicians tend to 
prefer tightening security measures as the simplest 
response to threats and risks. E.g., the director of the 
CIA John Brennan called on the 16th November 2015, 
three days after Paris terrorist attacks, to fill in the gaps 
in “the ability of intelligence and security services”, 
created, at least partially, due to Snowden’s disclosures. 
“In the past several years, because of a number of 
unauthorized disclosures and a lot of hand-wringing 
over the government’s role in the effort to try to uncover 
these terrorists, there have been some policy and legal 
and other actions that are taken that make our ability 
collectively, internationally, to find these terrorists much 
more challenging”, – said Brennan [9]. On the other 
hand, Snowden sufficiently contributed to the global 
awareness of a necessity of transparency and limits to 
the security measures. And to present another example, 
the ITI (Information Technology Industrial Council), 
the organization that presents the world leading high 
tech companies, rejected on the 19th November 2015 the 
call to weaken encryption and create backdoors to 
encrypted devices in order to give more possibilities to 
intelligence and security services [10]. To conclude, the 
practice of reacting with sole security measures won’t 
be successful, if politicians won’t at the same time 
address the fundamental causes of security and terrorist 
threats with political means.
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Шейко Ю. О.
РОЛь ПРИНцИПУ беЗПеКИ В ІсТОРІї ЛІбеРАЛьНОї ДУМКИ
Статтю присвячено проблемі кореляції між безпекою та свободою, яка стала дуже гострою 
після терористичних актів у Парижі 2015 р. Цю кореляцію розкрито в працях Т. Гоббса, Дж. Локка 
і Дж. Стюарта Міла як таку, що має велике значення для ліберальної думки. У статті доведено, 
що, хоча ліберальні мислителі акцентували увагу на формулюванні ліберального принципу свободи, 
принцип безпеки був для них не менш значущим. 
Ключові слова: безпека, свобода, лібералізм, ліберальна думка.
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